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ABSTRACT: My task in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the phi-
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1. Introduction 
Since the work of Thomas Kuhn, philosophers of science have been more assiduous 
in ensuring that their work is well-grounded in historical practice. In contrast to the 
abstractness of positivist analyses of science or the hagiographic accounts of science 
complained about by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch in The Golem (i.e., those accounts 
that appeal to ‘Mount Newton’ and ‘Mount Einstein’), it has been realized by philoso-
phers that historical case studies have to be taken more seriously if fidelity to real sci-
ence is to be maintained. 
 But there is a important problem to contend with if we admit historical cases to 
play a probative role in the philosophic examination of science. It is in fact a problem 
that attends to philosophic work generally. For in adjudicating philosophic disputes, 
whatever their topics, we need to have a resource of informative data. For example, in 
ethics we need access to exemplary ethical decisions, in the philosophy of mind we 
need unquestioned examples of things with minds, in aesthetics we need examples of 
art, especially of good art, in epistemology we need authoritative instances of knowl-
edge, justification and good reasoning, and so on. Thus, philosophic debate often pro-
ceeds by the formulation of a theoretical hypothesis, where one might initially argue 
for this hypothesis on the basis of a more general theoretical approach, followed by 
the testing of this hypothesis against various case studies. For example, suppose 
someone formulates an ethical theory according to which performing such and so act 
is deemed right. And let us say it is granted by most people that such an act cannot be 
right. We would then conclude that there is a problem with this ethical theory. Simi-
larly, it might follow on some theory of mind that a particular sort of thing lacks a 
mind. If we are inclined to concede such a lack, we are then motivated to approve of 
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the theory of mind that entails it. Examples of this sort, where cases adjudicate phi-
losophic theories, easily multiply. But perhaps now we see the hazard in this form of 
argument. For from where does one derive one’s set of adjudicatory case examples? 
That is, what justification do we have for using this set of case examples rather than 
some other set? Is the justification here theoretical? If so, the relevant justificatory 
theory better not be the one under scrutiny! But from where else are we to derive the 
relevant guidance? If we are going to use case studies to test the adequacy of a phi-
losophic theory and if these case studies are to be authoritative, then they need to be 
philosophically well-grounded —but that grounding can only come from the theory 
under evaluation if this theory purports to be philosophically fundamental. 
 At any rate, this is how we might express the problem as a paradoxer. It is an ex-
ample of the ancient problem of analysis: to wit, how can one analyze the nature of 
something without already knowing, i.e., having the correct analysis of, this very thing? 
It is also an example of the worry raised by the naturalistic fallacy: given that we want 
to analyze the concept X (say, the concept of a good act), our goal is to pronounce on 
what one should mean by X, for this will be its correct analysis. But what guidance do 
we have for this correct analysis? One obvious source is a set of examples of X. Sup-
pose then we pick from this set; we find an example of what X is. But then we are not 
so much interested in what X is, but what X must be, since we are analyzing X not just 
describing it. So just having examples of X is not good enough for analysis, and to in-
fer from these examples to the nature of X is a fallacy. I take it that instances of this 
sort of fallacy are especially salient in value theory —it is commonly noted that having 
instances of, say, good acts, does not unproblematically allow one to draw any conclu-
sions about what a good act is, since we are not sure if these instances of good acts 
really are good acts to begin with, absent a completion of our investigation into the 
nature of a good act, absent, that is, the analysis of ‘a good act’. Thus, in arguing for 
the immorality of a kind of act, one cannot simply point out instances of these acts 
and ostend their immorality, for one can rightfully complain that the immorality of 
these acts is the very question at issue.  
 In this paper, my concern is not this philosophic problem in its full generality, but 
solely with the form it takes in philosophy of science which is informed by historical 
case studies. In this regard, the ‘evidence problem’ (as I shall call it) has been given re-
cent expression in the work of Joseph Pitt (2001). Let me paraphrase Pitt’s concern as 
follows. In examining scientific practice we either go into this examination with cer-
tain preconceptions about what science is about or we do not. In the former case, our 
historical research into science filters through historical cases and weeds out those 
cases which do not conform to our preconceptions. Yet, by filtering in this way, we 
are challenged with the problem of how our preconceptions can be tested by this his-
torical research, if these preconceptions filter the case examples to begin with. So let 
us consider the alternative —let us avoid the use of substantive preconceptions in 
guiding our choice of historical cases. But now it seems we are served no better, for 
without any preconceptions about historical cases how do we know which historical 
cases to take seriously and which ones to dismiss? For example, what right do we have 
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to be assured of the quality of Galileo’s reasoning whilst righteously debunking 
Lysenko’s logic? What reasons could we give to justify the guidance we derive from 
the work of reductionist physiologists at the same time as we rebuff the reasoning of 
animists? Without a filter of preconceptions, we are rudderless in our choice of his-
torical data and it is difficult to see what constructive work will be performed in the 
philosophy of science from a historicist point of view. So, in dilemmical fashion, it 
seems we are logically in trouble whether we advert to historical cases, or not. 
 As it happens, I believe there are clear parallels here to the situation we are faced 
with in empirical research, generally speaking. It is indeed simply the problem of the 
theory-ladeness of observation. For example, with preconceptions about what granite 
is, we go out into the world and find samples of granite. But do we then make objec-
tive determinations of what is really in the world? That depends on what the stuff we 
are calling ‘granite’ really is, whether it really does satisfy our preconceptions of it. But 
do we have no access to that? Not directly —we only have direct access to what we 
think granite is, to our preconceptions of it, and how could such a thing test its own 
validity? Analogously we are faced with the same problem in historicist philosophy of 
science, except that the data are social scientific: we are observing the activities of a 
special group of people —scientists—, and where our focus is epistemological we are 
examining the status of these people as justifiers of beliefs, as knowers. As such, we 
observe how they go about defending empirical claims and theoretical hypotheses, and 
we use these observations to adjudicate our philosophical understanding of science. 
At this stage, it would seem that the theory-ladeness problem we face in such histori-
cist philosophic inquires is potentially quite grave, compared to what we are faced 
with in natural scientific observations, in that we are utilizing observed instances of 
the ‘good reasoning’ exhibited by scientists to assess theories of good reasoning, in a 
case where our modus operandi is, we hope, good reasoning itself. It is this special form 
of circularity that is of special concern to us here. Generally, one wonders how epis-
temologists can be said to non-circularly justify their conclusions about justification  
—this seems to be a special challenge for them. A good bulk of this paper is directed 
at addressing this sort of problem, specifically as it arises in historicized philosophy of 
science. 
 From one perspective, at any rate, perhaps the use of such social scientific evi-
dence in assessing epistemological theories is not so much of a worry compared to the 
sorts of theory-laden inquires made in the natural sciences. For consider again our 
geological example. In categorizing rocks into certain kinds, and then empirically 
studying these kinds, the ‘theory-ladenness problem’ points to the difficulty we have in 
ensuring that our categorization really does reflect the true nature of the world. For, 
once again, we cannot see the world ‘as it really is’, we cannot ‘get out of our skins’ to 
see the noumena behind the phenomena. By contrast, in the historicist use of social 
scientific evidence to decide between philosophical theories of science, perhaps our 
problem is alleviated somewhat since, in the process of researching scientific reason-
ing we can take into consideration the fact that we are reasoners as well. We can, in a 
sense, see the noumena behind the phenomena in investigating scientific reasoners for 
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in our theory-laden investigations into how people reason, using as case examples in-
stances of good reasoning exhibited by scientists, we have another source of informa-
tion to guide us, and that is our own awareness of how each of us reasons, and rea-
sons (we think) well. Now it is important to note that this alternative source of infor-
mation is quite fallible. No one is suggesting that we have solid a priori, rationalist ac-
cess to the nature of good reasoning. The point is simply that we have here an alter-
nate source of information that we lack in the natural sciences. It is as though in our 
research in geology we could routinely experience the world as the rocks we are study-
ing. No doubt, one’s experience of the world, qua rock, would be highly confused. But 
I think it would be foolish to ignore such a source of information; prima facie it sounds 
quite valuable, assuming such a circumstance to be conceivable. Similarly, in our em-
pirical research into good reasoning in science, it is valuable (but not decisive, of 
course) to factor in our reflective assessments of the case studies which are presented 
to us as evidence, that is, to factor in our own experiences of such reasoning, whether 
we view such reasoning positively or not. This is a source of information that it would 
be foolish to ignore. 
 Ultimately, it is because we have such a two-pronged attack into the nature of sci-
entific work —examining such work from the outside in the form of case studies, and 
examining it as well from the inside through considered reflection— that I am gener-
ally optimistic about historicist philosophy of science. And what I wish to do in the 
remainder of this paper is to explore how this two-pronged strategy can be used in de-
fusing the Pittean dilemma described above, thus perhaps setting the stage for a gen-
eral resolution to the meta-philosophic problem of how philosophers can non-
circularly use case studies in resolving philosophic controversies. 
2. The Process of Using Case Studies in Historicized Philosophy of Science 
What procedure should we use in accommodating the results of case studies in ad-
vancing claims on the philosophy of science? Here is my provisional recommendation. 
Our first step is to draw an initial partition of scientific cases into ‘good science’ and 
‘bad science’. For many philosophers this step is an easy one. For example, we find 
good science and good reasoning in Newton’s argument for Universal Gravitation in 
the Principia, and bad science and bad reasoning in Lysenko’s anti-Mendelian genetics; 
we find Darwin espousing good scientific logic in The Origin of Species whereas Henry 
Morris flounders logically in Scientific Creationism. There is no problem in performing 
such provisional judgements; and once we have settled on them it is appropriate to 
then let these judgements guide our philosophic inquires into science. But not inexo-
rably. Whatever provisional judgements we start with, there are circumstances under 
which they should be reconsidered. For example, what if a form of reasoning a ‘good 
scientist’ commends never occurs in the work of other ‘good’ scientists or occurs in 
the work of ‘bad’ scientists, or what if a form of reasoning a ‘bad’ scientist commends 
occurs in the work of ‘good’ scientists. Under these conditions, I think we should be 
circumspect in drawing epistemological lessons from such contestable good (or bad) 
scientific work. For I think it would be highly surprising if a purported good scientist 
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were to adopt a successful investigative strategy that remained hidden from view and 
beyond the power of invention by other scientists. Surely scientists start out equally 
equipped intellectually, though of course not equally equipped technologically, and if 
an investigative stratagem had been found to work in one case, its merits would in due 
course be made available to all, perhaps in independent discoveries. It is of course 
conceivable that a procedure is so specialized that other scientists in other fields see 
no use to it or that a procedure is so new that others have not had a chance to become 
aware of it. The philosopher needs to recognize these possibilities. But barring such 
circumstances we should be suspicious if, say, only Newton used a particular kind of 
investigative method. No doubt he is an exceptional thinker. But did not subsequent 
generations of researchers find any use for his method? If not, of what use could this 
method be? Conversely, suppose in examining Henry Morris’s work we find him to be 
reasoning in a way common to the work of presumed ‘good’ scientists; he adopts a 
reasoning strategy many others have found successful. Then, for all our wish to de-
bunk Morris, it will not do to dismiss his logic when it does not serve our ideological 
vent, and to approve the same logic when cast for more approved goals. Surely con-
siderations of fairness require that we not use Morris’ reasoning as exemplary of bad 
reasoning, and use the badness of such reasoning in an historicist fashion to justify a 
philosophic pronouncement, when it is the sort of reasoning used by many ‘good’ sci-
entists in different historical contexts. 
 There are further circumstances under which we should re-consider our provi-
sional categorizations of good and bad scientific work —specifically when a ‘good’ 
scientist appears to be reasoning in an ‘intuitively bad’ way, and when a ‘bad’ scientist 
seems to reason in a ‘sensible’ way. These considerations are less straightforward and 
more contentious, for quite frankly, it sounds aprioristic to qualify the probative force 
of historical cases by reference to our ‘intuitions’ or our ‘sensibility’. Nevertheless, it is 
a good idea to include such factors in investigating the reasoning of scientists since, as 
we noted above, we do not examine this reasoning from afar as though we were ex-
amining a piece of insensible rock. We are after all reasoners as well, so it cannot be a 
bad idea to include our intuited, sensed evaluations into the picture. Moreover, a key 
mitigating point to consider here is that whatever pronouncements we arrive it in this 
process, there is always the contrary force of what we find in our historical case stud-
ies, in what scientists actually do and approve of in terms of methodology. For in-
stance, suppose our a priori reflections suggest to us a rule of reasoning governing 
empirical research, and upon an application of this rule we are prompted to judge pre-
sumed ‘good’ scientific work as flawed. For example, suppose we judge, in our a priori 
wisdom, that the standard of error in science should be maximally low and that we 
should strive for infallibility. Intuitively, such a requirement sounds eminently prudent. 
Turning then to scientific work, we naturally find that no such work meets our stan-
dard. And we find that scientists, when presented with this standard, are universally 
dismissive of it. Such a standard is for them infeasible and unrealistic. What should 
our conclusion be? My claim is that, as philosophers, we need to rethink our a priori 
notions and perhaps discount them. Indeed, this is exactly what attends to the extreme 
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Cartesian scenario we just painted, for no one doubts the need to question such a 
standard. But I think there are less obvious and quite challenging cases of this sort of 
historical adjudication. That is, there are cases where, though rationalist intuition 
presses the reasonableness of an epistemic standard, a standard not seemingly too 
radical, scientists do not seem to follow suit. An example I have in mind concerns the 
question whether in retrieving empirical data it is worthwhile varying the experimental 
methods by which this data is produced. That is, is the epistemic quality of empirical 
data improved for its having been generated by two or more experimental regimens 
involving differing physical processes? Many philosophers have defended this ap-
proach —but I do not see scientists adopting it, in the main. It may be that scientists 
have something to learn from philosophers. But as a historicist philosopher my ap-
proach is to prompt us to question our a priori intuitions in such cases, if the histori-
cal facts do not bear then out. 
 Again, I have suggested that there is value in filtering our historical cases through 
our rationalist intuitions —these intuitions provide an important vantage point in ex-
amining case studies. But such intuitions are controvertible when they fail to capture 
the work and attitudes of practicing scientists. Moreover, I would hazard to say that 
such intuitions are not a particularly fertile source of information about scientific, and 
especially experimental methodology. The problem is simply that rationalist philoso-
phers have not been working at science and experimentation as long as scientists and 
experimenters have. In my own historical research, I have found scientists to be in 
possession of many remarkable strategies for wresting facts from nature. As a case in 
point, consider that Ptolemaic astronomy was invented almost two millennia ago and 
is still used today in guiding ships navigating the world’s oceans. Clearly there is sub-
stantial knowledge here about celestial patterns, the result of eons of careful observa-
tions and repeated testing of the principles of celestial motion. How was this accom-
plished? What normative principles did pre-Copernican astronomers use to establish 
their findings? I think it would be a momentous job to determine, from a priori 
scratch, what the relevant principles of reasoning were, what observations were made, 
what mathematical rules were deployed, to arrive at this monumental feat of cosmol-
ogy. And I think similar comments apply to many fields of science; the past work of 
scientists has been characteristically remarkable and ingenious. This leads me to con-
tend that scientifically-inclined epistemologists would do well to study these patterns 
of reasoning, not reinvent them. In other words, no matter how prescient our ration-
alist intuitions might be and despite the fact that they play a critical role in an effective 
historical philosophy of science, there are far too many important insights to be 
gained though the historical study of scientific work to cruise solely along a rationalist 
path.  
 Hopefully it is becoming clear how I propose to resolve the Pittean dilemma de-
scribed above. In brief, our choice of historical data in the philosophic investigation of 
science is not an untutored choice, for we filter our choice through our preconcep-
tions of the nature of good science. But these preconceptions are not the sole driving 
forces to our work. We need also consider the views of scientists themselves on the 
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quality of the science being explored, and to factor in what it is feasible to hold as a 
standard for scientific work, given the finite limitations of scientists as humans, whilst 
reflecting in the background on how ingenuous and intellectually remarkable scientific 
work often is. All in all, I am proposing a balanced approach, one that garners infor-
mation both rationalistically and historically, drawings conclusions that are at once in-
tuitively sound and substantiated in case studies.  
 Having presented in rough outline how I plan to defend historicized philosophy of 
science, my task from here will be to further this defence by responding to some ob-
jections to my view. Three particular objections come to the fore: I call these 1) the 
problem of ‘few data’, 2) the problem of ‘reflexive consistency’, and 3) the problem of 
‘flux’. By responding to these objections I hope to enhance and defend the approach 
to historicized philosophy of science I have just set forth. 
3. The Problem of Few Data 
In studying historical cases and drawing from them philosophical lessons, our project 
is inductivist and should be evaluated using the principles of good induction. Now, so 
far in our discussion above we have focused on one particular problem attending in-
duction, the problem of ‘sample bias’. This is the problem we face in selectively 
choosing those empirical, historical facts upon which to induce —there is the pros-
pect here of choosing those facts that preferentially suit our theoretical goals. Part of 
our response to this problem is to suggest that philosophers in studying the nature of 
scientific reasoning have, in a sense, an ‘inside track’ since they, too, are reasoners and 
so have a way of adjudicating in a nontrivial way judgments about what constitutes 
good, scientific reasoning. Moreover, let us add that when philosophers come to deci-
sions about the quality of scientific research, their decisions are not made in a vacuum; 
particularly, such decisions impact what sorts of conclusions can be acceptably drawn 
about other scientific episodes. If, for example, an experimental strategy is applauded 
in one particular scientific case, then all else being equal the same experimental strat-
egy should be applauded in the next scientific case. Requiring such consistency is an 
important constraint, one that has the capacity to quickly expose the flawed nature of 
some historically-based philosophies of science which occasionally err on the side of 
irrationally upholding the merits of one science and diminishing the merits of another, 
despite the fact that these sciences adopt kindred methodologies. 
 But sample bias is not the only problem confronting induction; there is also the is-
sue of ‘sample size’. How can it be feasible to generalize about all of science on the 
basis of inspecting one or two cases studies? Indeed, how is such a generalization le-
gitimate when the case studies themselves are presented with necessarily limited in-
formation. For example, one might cite the work of Galileo as exemplifying good sci-
entific practice —but there is a lot that is covered under the heading, ‘the work of 
Galileo’. He wrote many things, on many topics, endured many influences, had vari-
ous foibles, and so on; so to pick from his work an example of ‘good scientific reason-
ing’, and then to generalize to all Galilean science, or even more dramatically to all sci-
ence whatsoever, is presumptuous, to say the least. Consider, in addition, that there 
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are many different kinds of sciences to consider, from the natural to the social, the 
theoretical to the experimental, the ancient to the modern, the Eastern to the Western, 
the established and the frontier, and on from here. With all this data to consider, and 
factoring in the inevitable complexity and ambiguity of this data, how can an inductive 
move on the basis of one or two diluted case studies be anything more than specula-
tion? 
 I believe these sorts of comments are overly pessimistic. To illustrate, I want to 
consider an analogous argument considering the recent SARS epidemic. As the epi-
demic raged, researchers attempted to identify the virus underlying this outbreak. But, 
as we remember, many people had the disease and they came from many different 
places. Some are female and some are male. Some are rich and some are poor. Some 
people died from the disease; some survived. Some passed the disease to others and 
some did not. Though our current level of understanding concerning how viruses 
work is formidable compared to what we knew in the past, there is still much more we 
need to learn about viruses. In all likelihood, researchers of the future will amuse 
themselves with the rudimentary nature of our understanding. Nonetheless, should 
these considerations lead us to be skeptical about our work with SARS? Is our investi-
gation futile? Clearly not. Our current research is only a step to the future and there is 
no reason to resist formulating hypotheses about the nature of this disease and to 
pronounce sincerely about the etiology of SARS. To fall back on pessimism regarding 
our ability to understand this disease, a pessimism nurtured by the enormous scope of 
the data at hand and a realization of the dire complexity of viral pathogenesis, would 
make little sense to the medical community and would be unacceptable to the general 
public. So why not adopt the same attitude with regard to our inductive work in the 
process of understanding scientific practice? Is the highly complicated nature of a sub-
ject matter and the limited scope of evidence we have regarding it a reason to deny the 
value of induction in coming to understand it? 
 At this stage, the sceptical, anti-historicist critic can respond by drawing disanalo-
gies between empirical research in epidemiology and a similar kind of research in the 
history and philosophy of science. For, with SARS cases, we know that certain factors 
can be ignored. Given the characteristic symptoms of the disease, researchers have a 
fair guess that it is the same disease in Canada as it is in China and Hong Kong, and is 
caused by the same virus. That is, the legal jurisdiction in which one suffers the dis-
ease is not a factor in the identification of the virus, nor is one’s hair colour, one’s re-
ligion, one’s economic status, one’s reading preferences, and so on. In other words, 
scientists have a lot of opportunity to piece through the cases, removing irrelevant fac-
tors and connecting relevant ones, much simplifying their investigation. Finally, they 
are (or will soon be) able to isolate a unique biochemical signature for the virus that 
can be used to track it with fair consistency and without much controversy. And from 
there the SARS virus will end up being listed in the published literature as one more 
catalogued, microbiological phenomenon, just as well understood as any other virus.  
 None of this, surely, can happen with the historical cases studies in science, the 
skeptic continues. This is because scientific episodes are human episodes, and under-
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standing them requires, one anticipates, a fairly rich and deep understanding of human 
society and human nature, a feat reaching far beyond an understanding of such rela-
tively simple things as pathogenic viruses. So perhaps some modesty is due the his-
toricist philosopher of science if she contends that inductive leaps to the nature of 
‘science’ are equal to the task. Empirically researching and comprehending the enor-
mously complex phenomenon of scientific thought is a higher order task than under-
standing the etiology of a bad flu. 
 But once more the skeptic is excessively pessimistic. To preface my response, I am 
reminded of some comments made to me by an economist. I had queried him on the 
softness of economic data, on its pliability to differing interpretations. How does one 
examine a statistical trend on economic matters and draw any reasonable conclusions 
about these matters? One can read anything into the data, I was concerned. How can 
we be objective? His response was interesting and revealing, particularly because I do 
not think it was motivated by any conscious philosophical ideology. He remarked, 
with a dove-tailed swooping of his hand, that one must ‘see through the data’ to the 
objective reality behind. I was left with the image that he had some sort of x-ray ma-
chine that could peer through the surface of things to the reality underneath. But, as a 
description of a sort of scientific methodology, he was exactly right. Statisticians know 
this well: one is left with a set of data points, upon which one wants to draw a graph. 
The neophyte ‘connects the dots’; the expert ‘curves’. Comparatively, the doctors who 
first recognized the symptoms of SARS were confronted with a mess of cases, and 
then in a moment of inspiration saw a pattern —the disease’s symptoms, its character-
istic infectiousness, its surprising mortality— and then ‘saw through the data’ to the 
reality underneath, that there was a new condition here with its own disease patho-
genesis. The point here is that good scientists do not always need ‘lots of data’ to per-
form effective inductions, and in fact the more one gets hunkered down and preoccu-
pied with more and more data, the more we have an indicator that one’s understand-
ing of the situation is quite thin.  
 Now, without a doubt, I do not want to emphasize the reliability of this interpre-
tive vision I am claiming scientists to have —it is fallible along with all the rest of our 
intellectual and observational regimen. The point is simply that the imperative —to 
collect more and more data— is fruitless if a researcher has no idea what to look for 
and has no idea where to start, and that this is just as true in the sciences as it is in his-
toricist philosophy of science. Thus, to criticize historicist philosophers for ‘jumping 
to conclusions’ on the basis of a small data sample is, unless we are told more, unfair. 
Every researcher must take a chance on an interpretation, to start. The critical phase is 
what she does with that interpretation anon. That is, is her interpretation open to fur-
ther testing, and is she willing to entertain further, different hypotheses? Does she 
recognize her initial interpretation as fallible? As long as her critical mind-set is in play, 
there is no problem with ‘small data inductions’, and rigorous natural science is fully 
aware of this. 
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4. The Problem of Reflexive Consistency 
So let us grant, in performing historicized philosophical investigations, that we are not 
necessarily at a loss in only having recourse to a small data set. There is nevertheless, 
as I indicated earlier, something of a puzzle in the process of using historical case 
studies in science to advance claims about how best to reason, given that we are reason-
ing to these claims. The puzzle has two forms. First, suppose we start with style of rea-
soning X. Using X we investigate historical cases in science. The puzzles are, 1) in us-
ing X, could we learn that X is a flawed research strategy? And 2), could we learn that 
not-X is a strategy preferred by scientists?  
 With respect to 1), let us use as an example of X the process of induction, simply 
understood as the process in which we examine a number of cases, observe what is 
common to these cases and subsequently infer that all similar such cases have as a 
general property this common feature. Now, with X at hand, we attend to various 
case studies and observe whether they involve applications of X. But which cases 
should we use here? Those, of course, which exemplify what we take to be ‘good sci-
ence’. But presumably cases of ‘good science’, given our stated predilection to induc-
tion, will be cases where scientists actively engage in induction. When we see scientists 
reason in ways contrary to induction, we should, by our own lights, be sceptical about 
the value of these approaches. So our array of case studies will expectedly be popu-
lated by scientists using induction, or at least not populated by scientists flouting in-
duction. And now the hazard should be clear, for how could we ever learn on the ba-
sis of our case studies that induction is not a strategy deployed by scientists? Ostensi-
bly, we would be working from a population biased in favour of induction.  
 This is the problem of reflexive consistency. There seems to be an onus on a ra-
tional individual to approve of those standards of reasoning in others that conform to 
her own standard of reasoning. If one were to applaud reasoning in others that con-
futed one’s own reasoning, especially where one’s reasoning led one to conclude that 
others were reasoning in this way, then this would leave one in a ‘reflexively inconsis-
tent’ position.  
 Problem 2) is the corollary to problem 1). Suppose one were to deny that one’s ad-
vocacy of induction precluded one’s ability to recognize ‘good’ scientific episodes as 
involving contrary-to-induction procedures. Observations of this nature are not so af-
flicted by one’s preconceptions, one might suggest. And suppose now we examine 
various case studies to find that contrary-to-inductive measures are routinely author-
ized. Having sanctioned the use of induction for ourselves as historians, we now arrive 
at the conclusion, on the basis of induction, that scientists are contra-inductivists; and 
then, being historicists, we draw the conclusion that, to a first approximation, it is 
prudent to be contra-inductivist since scientists, after all, are contra-inductivists. But 
if, prudently, we then decide to be contra-inductivists, our main argument for 
concluding that scientists are contra-inductivists, itself based on induction, falls to the 
floor. So, overall, it does not seem that we can successfully argue on the basis of case 
studies that our provisionally preferred style of reasoning is a flawed one —supportive 
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cases are too easy to come by, and the probative force of non-supportive cases is re-
flexively undermined.  
 So do these considerations negatively impact the ability to engage in historicist phi-
losophy of science? If they do, I think it is only in a very narrow range of cases, those 
in which the method being used by the historicist philosopher is identical to the 
method being used by the subjects of the investigation, the scientists in the case study 
of concern. That is, in most circumstances reflexive consistency is not an issue be-
cause the scientists being investigated use methods completely unrelated to the meth-
ods used by philosophers —scientists pipette solutions, solve equations, adjust tele-
scopes, and so on, all things philosophers professionally never do. So let us focus on 
the more narrow range of methods that potentially are common to both philosophers 
and their scientist subjects, the practice of induction (as simplistically described above) 
being one of these. Could philosophic proponents of induction, presented with an ar-
ray of case studies involving induction, ever recognize induction as flawed? I think 
there is good reason to affirm this —philosophers can examine scientific inductive 
practice and, for independent reasons, recognize it as drawing the wrong conclusion. 
For instance, we are familiar with Russell’s chicken who, upon being fed dutifully for 
many days, infers on the next day (alas, ‘sacrifice day’) that he will be fed to live an-
other day. Historicist philosophers can easily recognize this happening in the sciences 
and it can inform their philosophic judgements, even if they are firm advocates of the 
style of reasoning being imputed. But in recognizing the failure of induction here, and 
perhaps in recognizing similar failures of induction in other cases, how could the his-
toricist conclude on the basis of induction that induction fails? Easily, by seeing these fail-
ures of induction as exclusive to the sorts of cases being studied. For instance, induc-
tion where one is a farm chicken reflecting on mortality may well be erroneous, yet it 
is an altogether different matter to consider the value of induction with regard to the 
historicist study of science. Thus, one can coherently reject induction as an informa-
tive practice in some particular subject area while preserving the value of induction in 
a different area, such as in the historicist study of science. 
 Similar comments I believe apply to those cases where the inductivist philosopher 
is faced with cases where scientists avow contra-induction. If she practices induction 
she seems forced to confute induction if she is to generalize over what turns out to be 
contra-inductive practices amongst scientists. But once again maybe not if, when ex-
amining these studies more closely, one finds that in their advocacy of contra-
induction scientists are arriving at the wrong answers. In fact, where contra-induction 
amounts to endorsing hasty conclusions without appeal to a broad range of cases, I 
think this is what we would find. Nevertheless, an inductivist philosopher could rec-
ognize on independent grounds that contra-induction succeeds in a particular set of 
circumstances, and could then argue inductively and cogently that contra-induction is 
epistemically preferable in these sorts of cases. This is possible so long as the cases 
under consideration are of a different sort than the ones reflected on philosophically. 
For example, contra-induction may work for cosmologists studying galaxy formation, 
and inductively the historicist may recognize this to be the case for galaxy formation 
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research generally —nevertheless, the historicist's induction concerns specifically 
‘what scientists do’, not ‘what galaxies do’, and so it is reflexively coherent for the his-
toricist to performs inductions in this way. 
 So, in general then, it need not be the case that by advocating and deploying rea-
soning strategy X historicists will fail to recognize flaws in X. Even where reflexive 
consistency inclines one to reject challenges to one’s form of reasoning, there are still 
ways to recognize flaws in this reasoning by examining historical case studies. This is 
because there are independent ways of determining that one’s form of reasoning is 
flawed. Moreover, once a reasoning strategy has been isolated as flawed, one can, 
while advocating this reasoning strategy affirm this flaw so long as the subject matter 
of the case study differs from the subject matter of the historicist’s investigation. 
 To conclude this section, let me introduce here a further sense in which historicist 
philosophy of science is threatened by the demand for reflexive consistency. Suppose, 
again, while in the process of examining historical cases we notice that scientists are 
deploying a reasoning strategy that we ourselves use in historical research. And again 
let the relevant reasoning strategy be the practice of induction as it is (loosely) de-
scribed above. And suppose further that we observe that the advocacy by these scien-
tists of induction is motivated irrationally; they do not seem to prefer induction for 
any other reason than they have been indoctrinated to do so, despite thinking that 
they have been critically evaluative in forming their methodology. Turning to our-
selves, then, we seem compelled to draw the appropriate historicist conclusion, that 
perhaps we too propound our inductivist strategy on irrational grounds. After all, the 
best sorts of reasoners, scientists, are subject to these influences, so why not the rest 
of us? So acknowledging this, we are faced with a serious concern, for one might sus-
pect that the accuracy of a method is dubious if such a method is adopted solely for 
non-epistemic reasons. For example, we might pass this judgment on the scientists we 
are investigating. And if we draw this conclusion, we cast doubt on our own reasoning 
since we too advocate induction as a reasoning strategy. But then it is induction that 
led us ultimately to the conclusion that scientists are improperly motivated. So if we 
suspect that induction is a flawed reasoning, this means that our assessment of our 
scientific subjects is inaccurate, casting doubt on our judgement that scientists are irra-
tionally motivated. And if this judgement is flawed, our own reasoning is no longer a 
problematic target —which restores the quality of this reasoning and so restores our 
original judgement that scientists are irrationally motivated. And on we go in an end-
less self-defeating circle. 
 This further problem of reflexive consistency attends prominently to the sociologi-
cal study of science, where conventional philosophers of science take heart in noting 
that if the sociologist’s causal explanation of scientific behaviour is correct, then such 
a causal explanation can equivalently be made as regards the sociologist’s own behav-
iour in arguing that scientific behaviour is caused, with the negative result that the so-
ciologist’s own reasoning falls back on itself with negative consequences. (See for ex-
ample Bloor 1991, Chapter 1, for discussion of this issue.) But the defeat only comes 
if we infer that the causation of a style of reasoning implies the poverty of this reason-
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ing —and this just is not true. Very good reasoning may have been inculcated in scien-
tists, as well as in sociologists and philosophers. That is, the inference form ‘this form 
of reasoning is caused (even uncritically)’ to ‘this form of reasoning is flawed’ is inva-
lid. Indeed, given that for most scientists their methodologies are learned by rote, even 
remarking that this inference has probabilistic value would be to misunderstand the 
value of scientific education. Thus I think this further problem of reflexive consis-
tency should not pose a problem for historicists —the cogency of reasoning remains 
even after a causal examination of those who adopt this reasoning. 
5. The Problem of Flux 
There is one final concern I wish to deal with here, which I call the problem of ‘flux’. 
Both Joe Pitt (2001) and Nicolas Rasmussen (2001) in speculating on the prospects 
for a historicized philosophy of science raise the possibility that scientific method is ir-
remediably disunified, that is, it lacks a set of guidelines that are binding on all sciences 
at all times. In this respect Rasmussen describes scientific method as ‘flux-like’, 
whereas Pitt’s description is ‘Heraclitean’. Here Pitt and Rasmussen are suspicious of 
what one might call the ‘One True Scientific Method’ and to some degree we can 
share their suspicion as many candidates for the ‘One True Method’ have in the past 
been proposed only to be subsequently firmly refuted. For example, the Euclidean 
method of deriving all of science from some a priori true set of first principles was fa-
voured by Descartes. However, at the crucial step of his deductive program Descartes 
needs to invoke the authority of God leaving many to doubt the relevance and value 
of his ‘deduction’. Likewise, Carnap’s method of reconstructing scientific language 
from remembrances of similarity and Russellian logic ambitiously sought to set in 
place a scientific method for grounding our knowledge of the world. Yet, as we all 
know, it was destined to fail and Carnap soon after gave up the project. Or again, 
some philosophers of science aspire to ground the cogency of scientific reasoning on 
Bayesian principles. Unfortunately for them there is little consensus that they will suc-
ceed at this (for example, see Mayo 1996 for a critique). So to this extent it seems that 
Pitt and Rasmussen’s incredulity at finding the ‘One True Scientific Method’ is vindi-
cated once we reflect on past philosophic attempts to identify this method. 
 Moreover, what do we learn when we turn to case studies drawn from science? Do 
we see a uniformity of method? This is, in fact, the main source of the doubt ex-
pressed by Pitt and Rasmussen regarding the existence of a univocal scientific method 
for, indeed, we find in science a multiplicity of techniques and strategies of reasoning. 
In the biological sciences cell specimens are chemically treated and examined under 
high-powered microscopes; in anthropology workers dig into the earth to uncover an-
cient artifacts; in astronomy researchers set up telescopes and, with cosmological 
models in hand, attempt to interpret the colours of distant galaxies. What do all these 
sorts of activities have in common apart from simple deductive logic and the use of 
observational data? Is there some special style of reasoning that underlies them all? 
Rasmussen (2001) finds nothing to tie them together and thus completely disinherits 
‘empirical philosophy of science’ (as he calls it). Pitt, on the other hand, is less cate-
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gorical —he recognizes there to be at least some provisional guidelines or ‘heuristics’ 
to be followed in science, though nothing he finds amounts to anything as precise as a 
‘method’. For both of them, an examination of scientific case studies reveal nothing 
that can pass muster of being a unique, solid method, attention to which scientists 
think will lead to the truth. Science is too ‘messy’ for this, the human-centred activity 
that it is. 
 The problem Pitt and Rasmussen are citing here cuts to the core of the concern of 
this paper. For, with a favoured a priori method in mind, we could probably dig in our 
heels and find this method used by all scientists, re-interpreting scientific activity 
where our interpretation demands this. But obviously this will not do, if we want to be 
objective about scientific practice. So we need to find some small set of core methods 
that can be observed to typify scientific reasoning, a set which scientists presume to be 
epistemically valuable in their inquiry into the physical world. And here I want to put 
forward such a small set. Abandoning rigour for another time, I take to begin with as 
the basis of my assessment a relatively cursory examination of the journals Science and 
Nature, the two gold-standard science journals in circulation today. Pick up any one of 
these journals and scan the styles of reasoning used by authors. Of course, the articles 
in these journals are highly technically sophisticated, yet this should not stop us from 
identifying the general structure of how these authors argue —and what we find is 
that the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method is standardly used. In practically every 
article a hypothesis is set up and observations are sought to confirm or disconfirm this 
hypothesis. There are exceptions, granted. For example, there are those cases in which 
the author simply reports on some unusual findings and makes some passing remarks 
on the implication these findings have for some current scientific theory. Neverthe-
less, H-D reasoning is quite commonplace and, frankly, I was shocked to see this hav-
ing been philosophically trained to dismiss a simplistic H-D view of science. Do not 
scientists know of the paradoxes of confirmation? Do they not realize for some hy-
pothesis H and evidence e that, if H implies e, then H (plus some irrelevant claim) im-
plies e, and so by H-D reasoning e confirms H (plus some irrelevant claims)? Of 
course, a scientist might wonder why we wanted to introduce an irrelevant claim to 
begin with. Still, I do not think that any such philosophic worries would dissuade sci-
entists from persisting in H-D reasoning, and I suppose for the sake of scientific pro-
gress we should be thankful for this. Apparently scientists persist with method that 
warrants the scorn of many philosophers, and in historicist fashion we should heed 
their preference, recommending on the basis of our historical inquiry (which certainly 
needs more rigorous presentation) the merit of the H-D method. 
 I offer finally two more examples of styles of reasoning which are commonly 
adopted in scientific work (again leaving the rigorous historical proof aside), here 
looking more intently at experimentation. Both these methods are typically adopted by 
experimenters. Specifically, where one is deploying a technical apparatus in an attempt 
to observe a particular physical phenomenon, one should check on the reliability of 
one’s technical apparatus, and ensure that this experimental result is found to occur 
under repetition in relevantly similar circumstances. 
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 Now perhaps these methods are mundane and obvious. But then why do Pitt and 
Rasmussen overlook them as candidates for inclusion in the standard, unalterable 
method that is common to all (experimental) sciences? Again and again experimenters 
aspire to ensure the reliability of their interventionist regimes, and the dictum to pro-
duce “the same experimental result under relevantly similar circumstances” is the 
mantra of all cogent experimental work. Thus, these common and quite specific con-
straints on experimental work should guide and inform our philosophic investigation 
into experimental science.  
 Of course, historical proof of the centrality of these methods would require a 
thorough laying out of the evidence, something not done here. And in fact in demand-
ing such a thorough proof we are advocating yet another norm of science, as secure as 
the preceding, to wit, in debating questions of empirical fact (the relevant question 
here being, “What methods do experimenters standardly use?”) one should perform 
sufficient empirical research before drawing any conclusions. In particular, we need to 
examine a myriad of cases, in proper empirical fashion, before pronouncing firmly of 
the ubiquity of methods 1) and 2) above. But what of the requirement to always seek 
more empirical evidence? Is it a secure method of science? No doubt it is —and it 
would always be strictly adhered to but for restrictions on time and interest.  
 Nevertheless, the important point to make here is that, despite the appearance of 
flux and disorder in science, despite the presumably ‘Heraclitean nature’ of scientific 
methodology, we should not as philosophers rest content with the view that we 
thereby observe the true nature of science. For such an opinion advances a perspec-
tive on science that conflicts with the practice of science and the attitudes of scientists 
regarding scientific method. Scientists, we find, when confronted with a ‘flux’ of data 
hardly ever resign themselves to the conclusion that the phenomena they are examin-
ing are a product of random, chaotic occurrences. To argue thus —to concede that 
there is just ‘flux’ and no natural law-like order— would be, pretty well, to give up the 
scientific game. Recall with the SARS case above that scientists never entertained the 
conclusion that the disease vector worked on the basis of heuristics, or had a random 
changing nature. Recall that my economist colleague above, when presented with an 
overflowing array of data, sought to ‘see through the data’ to the reality underneath. It 
is the goal of science to bring order to confusion, whether the subject matter is virol-
ogy, astrophysics, economics, anthropology, biochemistry, or whichever field. To be 
sure, it is still a possibility that, despite their ambitions, the natural world is found to 
be flux-like and chaotic after all —in fact this may be what quantum physics is sug-
gesting. But it would be foolish to draw this conclusion now and too hastily, as was 
the wont of the original Heraclitus. Similarly, it should only be with trepidation that 
one should avow the doctrine of flux in historical philosophy of science. For it should 
only be after a substantial empirical inquiry has tried to reduce chaos to order and 
been found to fail that one should accede to the skeptical positions of Pitt and Ras-
mussen. Has such a substantial inquiry ever been performed? Actually, this inquiry has 
only just begun —there is a mammoth amount of science to consider, and few phi-
losophers are having a serious look at it. 
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6. Conclusion 
In arguing for the legitimacy of historical philosophy of science I have, in a subtle 
way, argued on historical grounds. For in responding to both the problems of ‘small 
data’ and ‘flux’ I have made references to the activities and attitudes of scientists: sci-
entists, I have argued, are not deterred by a paucity of data —they will ‘see through’ to 
the (believed) reality underneath (and then argue hypothetically on that basis); more-
over, they are not deterred by an apparent chaos of phenomena —they will seek ra-
tional law-like regularities, in any case, to explain their observations. On the basis of 
these considerations I have recommended that historicist philosophers of science not 
be deterred either, buoyed by the actions of their brethren subjects. But is this not it-
self to argue historically, and precisely in the context where it is the very legitimacy of 
historicist approaches that is at issue? Indeed it is, so my last appeal is to leave open 
what one thinks about the ‘scientific attitude’ with respect to small data inductions and 
flux. Assuming I am right in characterizing the scientific attitude with regard to these 
issues (and this is a big assumption, worthy of historical adjudication), is it an attitude 
to be approved? Such an attitude on my view is wonderfully optimistic and prudent. 
But perhaps the reader finds the attitude uncritical and naïve. It all comes down to, 
then, what we think we can learn about epistemology by examining scientists and their 
work. 
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